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This paper presents the latest results of international research on equity-based 
crowdfunding, and thus – according to the authors’ current knowledge – fills a 
gap in the Hungarian literature. Equity-based crowdfunding offers a fundraising 
opportunity through online platforms for small and medium-sized enterprises 
seeking alternative forms of funding for growth opportunities and innovation in 
this digital age. Investors interested in risk-adjusted financial return have several 
methods available to handle capital market friction and agent costs in the context 
of “crowdfunding”. Information signals on entrepreneurial quality are essential for 
seasoned investors when making capital allocation decisions in a crowdfunding 
campaign. In addition to the national legislative framework, platforms have many 
different rules, techniques and cultural norms that attempt to handle capital market 
imperfections.
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1. Introduction
Resources intermediated via information technologies open the door for new types 
of business models and roles. Online exchange, sharing and cooperation between 
Internet users allows entrepreneurs to recognise opportunities, control resources 
and create capacity through crowdsourcing, marketing (social brand and word-of-
mouth) and crowdfunding (Shneor – Flåten 2015).
This paper focuses specifically on equity-based crowdfunding from among the 
many different business models available and presents its complex theoretical 
framework. The appearance of Hungary’s first crowdfunding portal for equity 
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purposes (tokeportal.hu) attests to the topic’s local relevance and its inherent 
business opportunities.
2. Equity-based crowdfunding
The shift in corporate funding towards cyberspace, the paradigm change seen 
in recent years and the shift of collective capital formation towards the digital 
realm is paving new paths. Equity financing offers the opportunity for early-stage 
fundraising and for bridging the funding gap for young, innovative startups. These 
financial innovations open the door for startups to obtain funding even if capital 
markets are not functioning. In the wake of the global economic crisis, business 
angels and venture capitalists have increased their investment activity and their 
preference has shifted to later-stage investments (Block – Sandner 2009). This 
trend has highlighted the timeliness and opportunities offered by equity-based 
funding, opening up new directions for research in the international literature. 
Equity-based crowdfunding (hereinafter: ECF) is likely to create great challenges 
for business angels and venture capitalists in the near future (Vulkan et al. 2015). 
Equity-based crowdfunding consists of entrepreneurs publishing open calls online 
for the sale of their equity shares in the hopes of attracting a large number of 
investors. The calls and investments take place through online platforms which 
provides tools such as the legal background, pre-screening and the handling of 
financial transactions. Equity-based crowdfunding is a model where investors 
acquire a stake in the company in the form of a share or share-like agreement (such 
as profit-sharing). Equity-based crowdfunding involves the sale of securities and 
is therefore significantly influenced by the legal environment of the host country 
(Bradford 2012).
In terms of the choice between traditional bank financing and crowdfunding, the 
latter offers financial benefits such as market feedback, product validation and 
community impacts. Imperfect information and moral hazard also affect companies’ 
choice between the available business models of crowdfunding. In case of equity-
based crowdfunding versus donation-based crowdfunding, financial return is 
important for investors alongside companies’ future capacity to generate cash flow. 
In reward-based crowdfunding, backers tend to look at whether the idea’s pitcher 
will be able to create and deliver the prepurchased product. For large-scale projects, 
the campaign-starting companies prefer equity crowdfunding and investors also 
factor in long-term profit; by contrast, the minimum threshold may be difficult to 
achieve with rewards-based crowdfunding in campaigns that require a high amount, 
so this format is generally preferred for smaller value, high-quality projects. If a 
product can reach a large customer base, reward-based crowdfunding enabling 
pre-purchases is preferred, while profit-sharing-based models are preferred for 
special niche products (Miglo 2016).
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3. Capital market imperfections
The problem of information asymmetry is a central issue in equity-based 
crowdfunding. Researchers are actively investigating the correlations between 
the disclosure of information and successful fundraising. Startups send different 
signals to angel investors and venture capitalists than to small investors. Small 
investors are less sophisticated in terms of their financial knowledge and experience 
compared to venture capitalists, who have extensive knowledge on startups and the 
founding teams’ valuation (Freear et al. 1994). Not every signal on startup quality 
is able to effectively handle information asymmetry. The effectiveness of signals 
depends on how perceivable they are and their cost, in other words how much 
investors take notice of them and understand the messages, and also depends on 
the costs of producing the signals not exceeding their benefits, in other words, 
they must be structured in such a way that dishonest signals do not pay (Connelly 
et al. 2011). Ahlers et al. (2015) investigate what project signals and entrepreneur 
quality attributes most spurred investors to pledge their financial resources in the 
context of equity-based crowdfunding. They found that projects that signal higher 
entrepreneurial quality and have perceptible characteristics are more likely to 
attract funding; the less detailed the information on the link between the offered 
business share and financial forecasts, i.e. the higher the uncertainty, the more 
careful potential investors will be when evaluating the startup; social capital and 
intellectual capital barely have an impact on campaign success. The hard signals 
issued by entrepreneur are discounted by investors while the hard information from 
investors significantly shapes campaign success; meanwhile, soft information from 
both entrepreneurs and investors reinforce network impacts (Estrin – Khavul 2016).
The fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur or overcapitalisation is typically 
interpreted as a sign of entrepreneurial intent and a greater fundraising opportunity 
(Leland – Pyle 1977). If the long-term objective of fundraising is growth in the 
context of equity crowdfunding, the startup must strive to retain control in the 
course of issuance. The proposed proportion of equity is generally disclosed on the 
platforms. Retaining equity can essentially be interpreted as a perceivable signal 
(Ahlers et al. 2015). On the one hand, entrepreneurs who offer a larger portion 
of their startup through the platform are less likely to attract potential investors; 
on the other hand, the success rate is higher for entrepreneurs with larger social 
networks, as this decreases uncertainty and increases visibility (Vismara 2015b).
Researchers are also investigating information asymmetry and the question of 
location. Seed-stage equity-based and platform-based interregional trading creates 
opportunities for startups, investors and legislators, contributing to more effective 
capital allocation. Angel investments are geographically localised; early-stage 
investors focus on local transactions. Although there is home bias in equity-based 
crowdfunding that characterises investors who are similar to business angels, there 
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is no such behaviour among sufficiently diversified investors (Hornuf – Schmidt 
2016). A common explanation for the absence of remote angel investments 
is information asymmetry. Although the Internet breaks down certain types of 
information constraints, it is incapable of transmitting face-to-face interactions 
such as the founding team’s grit, determination, interpersonal dynamics, and 
trustworthiness (Agrawal et al. 2015). The face-to-face personal communication 
characteristic of angel investors and venture capitalists (Moritz et al. 2014) is 
replaced on these platforms by pseudo-personal communication.
Equity-based crowdfunding syndicates made up of leading investors are able to 
tackle the issue of information asymmetry. These business formations present the 
transactions to masses of potential backers (Agrawal et al. 2015) and link the face-
to-face due diligence and monitoring that is characteristic of the off-line realm with 
online global access. The introduction of syndicates in equity crowdfunding is a 
relatively new phenomenon, available on AngelList since 2013. This platform allows 
individuals, angel groups and private equity funds to form syndicates and boasts a 
far higher rate of successful syndicated transactions compared to non-syndicated 
transactions. Venture capitalists therefore tend to prefer the syndicate strategy 
to increase the number of incoming transactions, improve brand reputation and 
provide sound arguments to their key partners with a view to concluding effective 
agreements (Coppey 2016). A syndicate is essentially a pre-screening mechanism 
prior to the subsequent non-syndicated investment stages. Syndicate leaders are 
generally well-connected through investment channels and business opportunities, 
which creates conflict of interest with unsophisticated small investors seeking to 
invest in startups. There is thus a trade-off in syndicated equity crowdfunding 
between access to deals and conflict of interest (Itenberg – Smith 2017). The authors 
demonstrated that syndicated investment offer rounds are riskier, yield slower 
return, and startups in which a syndicate leader invested earlier perform worse.
In the case of equity-based crowdfunding, a kind of counterselection resulting in a 
sub-optimal balance can be observed, i.e. a process in which the price and quantity 
of products and services change within a given market because one counterparty 
possesses information that the other party cannot obtain even at a reasonable cost. 
According to Agrawal et al. (2015), neither ordinary investors nor startup founders 
are able to correct information asymmetry at a reasonable cost in the context of 
crowdfunding. Ordinary investors typically lack the time, money and expertise to 
be involved in the daily management and supervision of the startups they fund. 
On the other hand, startup founders have a better understanding of what they are 
doing and their market prospects, but have limited resources to communicate with 
the investors, to widely disseminate information and to prepare detailed financial 
reports. Moral hazard is when the party which incurs the costs has to assume 
disproportionate risk. Once a crowdfunding campaign ends, backers do not have 
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effective means to force startup founders to perform in line with the promised 
conditions. At this point, the acquired equity belongs to the startup, the bargaining 
position has shifted between opportunistic startups and investors, while ordinary 
investors assume the risk of loss.
The examination of campaign updates introduced a dynamic approach into research 
following the static analysis of information asymmetry. Startups can increase the 
probability of their equity-based crowdfunding campaign succeeding by disclosing 
up-to-date information. It is thus useful to know which types of updates are 
effective. Updates related to the number of investments made by the crowd and 
the amount of investments collected by startups have a positive impact on campaign 
success with a few days’ delay (Block et al. 2016). According to the authors, this 
impact increases with the number of words featured in the updates, but decreases 
in parallel with the number of updates. They pointed out that updates related to 
the startup team (qualifications, age and personal interests), the business model 
(expected market, business idea, future business orientation and expansion 
expectations), co-creation projects and product development no longer have a 
major impact on the level of success. By contrast, updates on new funds (e.g. from 
angel investors, venture capitalists or tenders), the development of the business 
related to increases in sales revenues and favourable customer feedback as well 
as the promotional campaigns led by the startup, with networking taking place on 
social media, have a positive impact. Businesses release significantly more updates 
during the funding campaign than afterwards and publish more information if the 
campaign did not reach the funding objective or if the remaining funding period is 
short (Dorfleitner et al. 2017). According to Dorfleitner et al., businesses use some 
linguistic tools in their updates that strengthen group identity and group cohesion, 
and the probability of updates is higher when there is strong competition among 
the crowdfunding campaigns running in parallel.
The success rate is higher for those businesses that are also supported by 
professional investors (business angels and venture capitalists) and which obtained 
some grant money, or have protected their intellectual capital in the form of patents, 
trademarks or copyrights – pointed out Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016), who also 
emphasised that if the business hired a consulting body, appointed nonexecutive 
directors or involved consultancy firms, or if the owner intends to keep a larger 
share of the business after the funding, a successful campaign is more probable. 
According to some other studies, the campaign’s success is determined by the 
pre-filtered campaign characteristics and the private and public networks, i.e. the 
investment decision criteria applied by traditional venture capitalists and angel 
investors are less relevant (Lukkarinen et al. 2016).
Early supporters play a key role in the success of crowdfunding campaigns on 
donation-based platforms (Burtch et al. 2013), reward-based platforms (Colombo 
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et al. 2015) and debt-based platforms (Zhang – Liu 2012). Empirical evidence to 
support this in the case of equity-based crowdfunding has been missing for a long 
time. On equity-based crowdfunding platforms, the names of individual investors 
are public and immediately accessible for every single offering which, in turn, affects 
the behaviour of future investors. Creating momentum in an early stage is a success 
factor, as the information can be evaluated based on the list of previous investments 
of early supporters which may convince future investors. Those investors who made 
their profile public often have higher qualifications, more project specific industry 
experience and a longer list of investments made through the platform. Additionally, 
their offering share compared to other investors is larger during the initial days 
of the campaign and then declines over time (Vismara 2015a). According to the 
author, information cascades are being formed as the presence of investors with a 
public profile attracts additional investors as the result of the “success brings more 
success” process. The psychological concept of observation-based social learning 
(Bandura 1977) appears in the financial literature as information cascades (Welch 
1992). Two conditions must exist for the information cascade to occur: uncertainty 
and sequentiality (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Uncertainty appears more on the 
demand side of equity-based crowdfunding, where investors are less capable of 
overcoming information asymmetry. In this case, the signals sent by additional 
investors, i.e. the mass impact, becomes significant. In the course of crowdfunding, 
subsequent investors learn from observing the behaviour of previous supporters.
The dynamics of crowdinvesting is L-shaped on the platforms operating on “first 
come first served” basis, while it is U-shaped on the platforms operating on “sealed 
offer and secondary price auction” basis. (Hornuf – Armin 2015). Therefore, we 
have evidence supporting the idea that investors make their decisions based on the 
information updates provided by the entrepreneur and based on the investment 
behaviour and comments of other crowd investors. Campaign attributes, the level 
of investor sophistication, the process of granting funds, herd behaviour and stock 
exchange volatility determine the extent to which investors are willing to pay for the 
cash flow rights of startup businesses (Hornuf – Neuenkirch 2015). It is difficult to 
tell to what extent crowdinvestors become small business angels: sometimes they 
invest together with professional investors, but sometimes they are the competitors 
of business angels (Hornuf – Schwienbacher 2014).
In terms of their composition, crowd investors cannot be considered as a 
homogeneous community. Wallmeroth (2016) revealed that strategic investors 
investing a larger part of their own assets are less likely to become investors who 
later return to the platform and are more likely to invest in businesses that will not 
go bankrupt after the campaign. In his opinion, it is likely that investors offering 
large amounts are sophisticated, professional investors as opposed to the crowd 
of less sophisticated investors sporadically investing small amounts. According to 
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Brown and Davis (2017), equity crowdfunding is characterised in general by the 
“all or nothing” funding style, the scarcity of investor profit and the crowd of non-
cooperating investors.
In the case of equity crowdfunding, nonfinancial motivations are not typical, and 
investors are more likely to redeem after the campaign their intention to make 
a financial commitment expressed during the campaign than in the case of the 
reward-based model (Cholakova – Clarysse 2014). As for crowdfunding providing 
financial return, crowdinvestors are typically young men with degrees motivated 
by the acquisition of business share and by excitement (Daskalakis – Yue 2017). On 
the markets of equity crowdfunding, 93 per cent of investors are men, which can 
be explained more by the gender difference related to risk avoidance than by the 
differences in terms of excessive self-confidence (Hervé et al. 2016). One interesting 
observation is that the balanced presence of genders is the highest for equity-based 
crowdfunding compared with all other forms of business funding, and furthermore, 
that gender determines the nature of the relationship between demand and offer of 
capital: According to Vismara et al. (2016), projects of woman-led businesses have 
twice as many female investors than those helmed by men. The authors showed 
that although the great majority of investors are men, women invest 34 per cent 
more in general.
The literature also addresses the performance indicators after the campaign. One 
year after a successful campaign, the businesses’ revenues and the growth rate of 
their sales increased, which shows a positive link with the large number of investors 
during the campaign, while the profit dropped in general. According to Décarre and 
Wetterhag (2014), these trends resemble the one seen when business ventures are 
investing in companies. They also emphasise that a PR effect can be felt, resulting 
from the fact that these businesses also use the campaigns for marketing and 
promotional purposes. Based on their research of equity crowdfunding platforms 
in the UK between 2011 and 2015, Signori and Vismara (2016) found that only 
10 per cent of the businesses failed, and 30 per cent of them were able to involve 
additional funding with one or more seasonal share issuances, while investors’ 
average expected return was 8.8 per cent.
4. Equity-based crowdfunding platforms
Social networks and online platforms create new opportunities to raise funds for 
businesses and enable nonprofessional investors to place their funds without 
the use of financial intermediary systems. The acceleration and scaling of early 
funding opportunities within business funding schemes via Internet platforms can 
be exploited, taking account of the given regulatory system, which creates a balance 
between capital formation and investor protection. The platform is an architecture 
194 Essay
Mónika Kuti – Zsolt Bedő – Dorottya Geiszl 
which enables the exploitation of the signals and network effects in a reduced 
transactional cost environment (Estrin – Khavul 2016). The transactional interface 
for ECF must provide the legal background and the pre-screening of businesses, 
and allow financial transactions to be made (Ahlers et al. 2015). Intragroup and 
intergroup moderation is possible on the platform acting as an intermediary 
interface (Belleflamme et al. 2015; Viotto 2015). ECF is a multiple-phase process 
where targeted communication is needed for business ideas to be convincing on 
the platform and for investors.
According to Löher (2016), the three important areas of the intermediary role 
include a) project pre-screening, where the platform relies on its own networks 
thanks to access to deal offers, which has the objective of reducing the cost of deal-
seeking; b) the use of standardised contracts that comply with the legal background; 
and c) communication to reduce information asymmetry and promote a uniform 
campaign strategy. These platforms essentially search, assess and structure 
investment opportunities.
Brown et al. (2016) formulated the following correlations in terms of crowdfunding 
and platform efficiency:
1.  The equity-based crowdfunding platform must simultaneously ensure that 
entrepreneurs can lawfully raise capital, and that investors can lawfully access 
investment opportunities.
2.  It is more naïve investors narrow-mindedly following signals and basing their 
decisions on mass wisdom and not sophisticated investors who are needed for 
the equity-based crowdfunding platform to be efficient.
Lower quality businesses with a smaller social network are forced to turn to the 
crowd if they are unable to obtain funds from friends, family members, business 
angels or from venture capitalists through traditional early-stage funding. To reduce 
counter selection and moral hazard, in addition to legislation, various platform 
rules, self-regulation forms, technical features and cultural norms were born, which 
influence what quality and what types of startups are attracted by the platform. 
Investment ceilings, fundraising ceilings, limited disclosure obligations, platform 
investments, crowd audits, additional disclosures and performance transparency, 
and milestone-based financing are the rules and methods that minimise the chance 
of market failure (Catalini et al. 2016). The differentiating characteristics of high 
quality startup businesses and the renowned portals functioning as intermediaries 
may represent the way out of the Lemons Problem (Ibrahim 2015).
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The platforms channel the flow of investments with standardised contracting 
practice. The platforms make various business offers for the rights to shareholder’s 
equity, profit sharing and future share capital. The offering of non-equity securities 
is aimed at short-term profit sharing not including shareholder rights. In parallel, 
the platform also discloses a timing for the future investment rounds and strives 
to prevent that businesses maintain a costly, long-term relationship with a great 
number of small investors. The rights to future equity securities offered on the 
platform last until the occurrence of some future investment event. Future equity 
capital offers postpone the acquisition of shareholder’s rights until the point when 
the high-growth startup becomes the target of acquisition, IPO or risk capital 
financing when crowd investors receive their ownership share. In the meantime, 
crowd investors do not have shareholder’s rights, which would entail a number of 
costly, time-consuming risks and obligations. The link between the features of the 
early stage startup financing and the transparent investor agreement comes from 
the Simple Agreement for Future Equity, SAFE, as a deferred equity instrument. 
Another solution for the same issue is the KISS or Keep It Simple Security, which is 
essentially a convertible bond according to which the startup business promises 
the investor to repay the capital with some interest. KISS turns into a property 
right once the startup reaches certain milestones, such as acquisition, IPO or the 
involvement of risk capital. Therefore, the difference between KISS and SAFE is 
that if the investment is not converted into a property right, then in case of SAFE, 
the investors lose their capital while in the case of KISS, they gain it back through 
debt service. According to Wroldsen (2017), there are great opportunities in these 
two simplified contracting forms, but interestingly investors benefit more from the 
collective protection provided by social media than from the formalised contractual 
rights.
On the German crowdfunding market, the subordinated loan providing profit 
sharing became dominant as an investment form. According to Klöhn et al. (2016), 
the most recent trends include that the minimum maturity time went from 4 years 
to 6-8 years, lately offering fixed interest payment, and investors are also entitled to 
profit sharing. The number of contracts granting the right to share in exit revenues 
increased recently, while veto rights have been discontinued, and dilution is now 
possible for next round investments. On German equity crowdfunding platforms, 
crowd investors greatly depend on venture capital funds because they do not hold 
any share capital in the businesses. Such venture capital funds have a vested interest 
in crowding out small investors through their mezzanine financing contracts; in 
response to this trend, the platforms created contracts that promote the coexistence 
of these two groups (Hornuf – Schmitt 2016).
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5. Conclusions
In recent years, equity-based crowdfunding platforms started to emerge once 
the legislative and regulatory environment had been created. Compared to 
other crowdfunding business models, investors are driven by financial return and 
entrepreneurs come up with larger investment projects compared to the average 
project size of reward-based crowdfunding. A number of success factors have been 
identified, including signs of strong entrepreneurial skills, the internal proportions 
of business share offering, the retention of ownership, the availability of hard 
information on investors, the size of the entrepreneurs’ social networks and updates 
identifying future growth opportunities. When creating equity-based crowdfunding 
platforms, attention must be paid to the concordance of pre-screening, deal 
offering and the processes defined by the standardised contracts, compliance with 
the regulatory environment and the consideration of switching effects between 
network effects strengthening platform reputation. Off-line investment agents 
have a beneficial effect on the platforms operating in the given region. Striving to 
establish best practices requires constant innovation which can be observed in the 
case of experiments with syndicate strategies and also in the case of the evolution 
of the various securities and rights serving the reduction of conflict of interest 
between crowd investors and sophisticated investors.
The ever increasing development of digital technologies, blockchain and bitcoins 
with the so-called Initial Coin Offering deals propose new directions in the world 
of business investments through platforms the analysis of which goes far beyond 
the framework of this study.
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